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Since the nation’s founding, Americans have experimented with many 
different methods of judicial selection and retention. We have tried ap-
pointment-based systems, including appointment by the president or by the 
governor, with or without confirmation by the legislature. We have tried 
election-based models, including partisan elections, non-partisan elections, 
and elections by the legislature. We have even tried hybrid models that 
blend appointments and elections, the most famous example known as the 
Missouri Plan: appointment by the governor (with the aid of a panel), fol-
lowed by a retention election.1 Centuries of experimentation have led to 
some uniquely American methods of choosing judges: neither judicial elec-
tions (how most of our state judges are chosen) nor life-tenure (the term of 
office for our federal judges) have caught on in other parts of world.2 
Despite the wide range of selection methods in existence throughout 
the nation, neither the American people nor legal scholars have given much 
thought to tailoring the selection method to particular levels of the judiciary. 
To the contrary, the most common approach to judicial selection in the 
United States is what I will call a unilocular, “a judge is a judge,” approach. 
For most of our nation’s history, all judges within a jurisdiction have been 
chosen the same way. Proponents of this view see judges at all levels of the 
judiciary—trial, intermediate appellate, and courts of last resort—as a ho-
mogenous group, at least when it comes to how we choose them. Our feder-
al judiciary exemplifies this approach. All Article III judges are appointed 
by the president and confirmed by the senate. All of them serve for life. We 
have adopted this unilocular system even though the work of a judge in, say, 
the Western District of Arkansas is very different from the work of a Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
* Dmitry Bam, Professor and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, University of Maine 
School of Law. 
 1. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 
1600 (2009) (describing the various methods of judicial selection and retention used by the 
states). 
 2. Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251, 255 
(2004) (“The U.S. choice of life tenure with no age qualification, either at entry or on exit 
(that is, minimum experience requirements or mandatory retirement ages), is quite unusual.”). 
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Most states have taken a similar tack, with approximately forty states 
using a uniform selection method for all levels of their state courts.3 For 
example, in fourteen states all judges are appointed by the governor from a 
list submitted by a judicial nominating commission.4 Another fourteen use 
nonpartisan elections for all their judges.5 Eight more use partisan elections 
for all their judges.6 All in all, once a state chooses a selection and retention 
method for its judges, it adopts that approach for the whole judiciary. 
But it does not have to be this way. In this article, I will suggest that we 
should at least consider tailoring the judicial selection method to different 
levels of the judiciary. After all, judges are not a monolithic, homogenous 
group, and the work of a trial judge differs significantly from the work of an 
appellate judge.7 What I call “tailored judicial selection” can help address 
some of the concerns raised by the proponents and the opponents of judicial 
selection. 
Of course, both trial and appellate judges are tasked with resolving le-
gal disputes by applying the law to the facts. And both make important deci-
sions that change the direction of the law, not only for the litigants in a spe-
cific case, but for the jurisdiction in general. Despite these similarities, trial 
judges are engaged in significantly more fact-finding and case management, 
and they perform more case-by-case adjudication and law application. Trial 
judges also interact more directly with the litigants, supervise the discovery 
and settlement processes, decide numerous evidentiary motions and other 
motions in limine, and preside over bench and jury trials.8 Appellate judges, 
on the other hand, are generally tasked with resolving the most difficult (and 
often the most divisive and inconclusive) legal issues in cases, adopting the 
factual findings made by lower courts. It is no secret that all judges engage 
in some lawmaking, but appellate judges are significantly more likely to 
 
 3. See Ryan Fortson & Kristin S. Knudsen, A Survey of Studies on Judicial Selection, 
32 ALASKA JUSTICE FORUM 1, 8–9 (2015). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 8. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The Honorable Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, The Speeches of Frank M. 
Coffin: A Sideline to Judging, 63 ME. L. REV. 467, 478 (2011) (“[T]he appellate judge is 
quite a different animal from the trial judge.”); Jason R. Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Proce-
dure in Antidiscrimination Law, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 90 (2015) (contending that trial judges 
and appellate judges “play different roles in our civil justice system”); Terry A. Maroney, 
Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1514 n.179 (2011) 
(“[A]ppellate judges’ work is quite different from that of trial judges.”). 
 8. In recent years, the number of trials nationwide has decreased significantly. As a 
result, trial judges spend significantly more time managing discovery and settlement than 
presiding over trials. This is particularly true of jury trials, which have largely disappeared 
from court dockets. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty 
Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1259–62 (2005) (discussing the decline in the number of 
jury trials at the state and federal levels). 
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make law.9 In addition, appellate judges have significantly less direct inter-
action with the litigants, other than during oral argument, and much of their 
work consists of legal research and writing. 
To the extent that these two groups of judges are qualitatively different, 
not only serving different judicial roles but requiring a different set of 
skills,10 we should at least consider tailoring the selection mechanism to fit 
the nature of the court in question. Instead, it has been almost universally 
rejected and the question is rarely, if ever, asked. Judicial selection scholars 
have given little thought to tailored judicial selection, choosing instead to 
explore the challenges associated with judicial elections and judicial ap-
pointments.11 Constitutional law scholars generally focus their attention on 
the work of the United States Supreme Court, but even when writing about 
the judiciary as a whole, these scholars rarely distinguish between different 
levels of the judiciary. 
There are a few states that depart from that trend. For example, in Flor-
ida, appellate judges are appointed by the governor, who must select a can-
didate submitted by a judicial nominating commission, but trial courts of 
general jurisdiction are filled through nonpartisan elections.12 In New York 
and Tennessee, partisan elections are used only for trial court judges, while 
judicial nominating commissions are used for both states’ high court.13 But 
even when states depart from the monolithic approach, little thought is gen-
erally given to tailoring the selection method to either the nature of the work 
performed by the judge or how the purposes of judicial elections (or judicial 
appointments) are served by the court in question. Rather, the decisions to 
adopt differential selection methods appear to be the result of an accident, 
history, or unfounded assumptions. 
While I support these states’ efforts to tailor judicial selection, this arti-
cle argues that the states adopting such an approach have chosen to elect 
(and to appoint) the wrong judges. I will explain why, if we are going to 
have elections for some judges, it is the justices on the courts of last resort, 
and not trial judges, who should be accountable to the electorate. It is at the 
highest levels of the state judiciary where accountability is most lacking, 
most needed, and most feasible. Trial judges, on the other hand, should be 
chosen via a merit scheme with significant input from lawyers, litigants, 
court staff, and the state bar associations. Unlike state courts of last resort, 
 
 9. RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (First Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2010). 
 10. Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely 
Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1408 (2006) (“[T]he skills that make one a good appellate 
judge are so different from the skills required of a trial judge.”). 
 11. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 
278 (2008) (describing the literature critiquing the use of judicial elections). 
 12. See Fortson & Knudsen, supra note 3, at 7. 
 13. Id. 
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accountability to the electorate is not only most present for state trial judges, 
but also least necessary and least feasible. 
This article offers a few reasons for my unorthodox proposal. First, I 
argue that accountability is most crucial at the courts of last resort. State 
supreme court justices are significantly more likely to face controversial 
constitutional questions and other difficult legal questions that do not offer a 
legalistic or formalistic solution.14 Unlike trial judges, who tend to engage in 
more case management and dispute resolution, supreme court justices tend 
to engage in more lawmaking.15 
Second, not only is accountability more crucial for state courts of last 
resort, but it is also most lacking in those courts. The decisions of trial judg-
es are reviewed by one or two levels of appellate courts.16 The decisions of 
state supreme court justices are generally either not reviewed (because the 
United States Supreme Court takes very few cases each year) or unreviewa-
ble (because the state high court is the final word on issues of state law). 
Trial judges cannot overturn state supreme court precedent; state supreme 
court justices can. 
Third, the public is in a much better position to hold state supreme 
court justices, but not state trial judges, accountable because it is much more 
likely to understand the nature of their work and more of their work is legis-
lative in nature.17 In addition, each state only has a few supreme court justic-
es but many trial judges; thus, it is more feasible for the electorate to get to 
know members of the state high court. 
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I examine the different 
methods for judicial selection used in the states, focusing in particular on the 
 
 14. One would expect the easiest legal questions to be filtered out during the lengthy 
litigation process. John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 354 n. 
86 (1986) (predicting that “only the most difficult issues should survive” in appellate cases). 
Cf. James C. Ho, The Office of the Solicitor General: Ten Years of Representing Texas Inter-
ests, 21 APP. ADVOC. 104, 104 (2008) (discussing the “challenging constitutional and other 
legal issues that tend to dominate the most difficult appellate matters.”). 
 15. Stephen J. Ware, Originalism, Balanced Legal Realism and Judicial Selection: A 
Case Study, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 181 (2013). 
The political/lawmaking side of judging looms larger, the higher the 
court. In other words, the extent to which (inevitable) judicial lawmaking 
allows judges to inject their political views into law rises, the higher the 
court. Trial judges play less of a lawmaking role than appellate judges, 
especially supreme court justices, simply because court systems are hier-
archical and trial courts are at the bottom. 
Id. 
 16. Most states have an intermediate appellate court and a supreme court that provide for 
two layers of review of trial court decisions. 
 17. Ware, supra note 15. 
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purposes of judicial elections and the relationship between judicial elections 
and the twin towers of judicial independence and judicial accountability. 
Part III puts forth the reasons states should consider tailoring judicial selec-
tion methods and develops a general framework for deciding which judges 
should be elected and which judges should be appointed. Part IV applies that 
framework to different levels of the judiciary. This analysis leads to Part V, 
where I conclude that judicial elections are particularly ill-suited for trial 
judges, and, if they are to be used at all, are most appropriate for justices on 
the courts of last resort. 
II. THE PURPOSES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
Judicial elections are one of America’s most unique democratic inven-
tions. They are virtually unknown throughout the world, and certainly no 
other nation elects such a large segment of its judiciary.18 In the United 
States, nearly ninety percent of state judges, in a total of thirty-nine states, 
depend on the electorate to obtain, or to retain, their jobs.19 It was not always 
so. At the time of the founding, the colonies, and then the states, allowed 
either the governors or the legislature to select the state judiciary.20 Those 
judges then served for a term of years, or in some places, for life. Indeed, 
that is the model that was adopted by the founders for the federal constitu-
tion.21 
The middle of the nineteenth century saw a shift from an appointed to 
an elected judiciary. Much has been written about this transformation of 
American courts, and I will not rehash that history or its causes here.22 Ra-
ther, I want to focus on the connection between selection methodology and 
the work of judges. At its core, the struggle between different judicial selec-
tion methods has corresponded to a debate about judicial independence and 
accountability. While most people today link elections to accountability, 
 
 18. Throughout much of the world, the judiciary is part of a professional civil service 
system. To become a judge, law graduates must finish near the top of their class, sometimes 
attend special “judge school,” and perform well on a final examination. Promotions within 
the judicial branch are typically based on years of service and performance, with judges and 
judicial selection committees playing prominent roles in promotion decisions. See, e.g., Ma-
ria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in 
Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 395 (2000) (“In Germany and France, exams are 
required to become a judge and French judges most often come from the Judicial School.”). 
 19. JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2012). 
 20. Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina’s Experiment: Legislative Control of 
Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1220 (1998) (“At the country’s founding, 
most states appointed their judiciary.”). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1. 
 22. The best book on this history is Jed Shugerman’s The People’s Court. See 
SHUGERMAN, supra note 19. 
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judicial elections were intended to create a more accountable and a more 
independent judiciary.23 
Judicial elections are simultaneously terrific and terrible for judicial in-
dependence. On the one hand, some argue that judicial elections foster judi-
cial independence by creating a greater separation of powers between the 
judiciary and the other branches of government.24 This separation gives 
judges the freedom and the confidence to act as an aggressive check on leg-
islative and executive branches.25 Rather than worrying about what a reap-
pointing governor or legislature may think about a judge’s decisions, judges 
can focus on deciding cases according to the mandates of the law. Others 
respond that judicial elections threaten judicial independence by stifling the 
judges’ ability to check majoritarian abuses and protect the rights of minori-
ties and unpopular individuals.26 Rather than deciding the cases according to 
the requirements of the law, elected judges now worry about pleasing the 
electorate.27 
Ironically, judicial elections are also good and bad for judicial account-
ability. Proponents of judicial elections emphasize the elections’ ability to 
hold judges accountable.28 Like all elections in a democratic society, judicial 
 
 23. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and 
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1119 (2010) (describing the advent of “judicial 
elections to foster a more independent, more vigilant judiciary to enforce [limits on the state 
legislatures] through judicial review.”). 
 24. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters 
for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1261 (2008). 
Although the early impetus for partisan judicial elections may have been 
a desire for greater accountability, the partisan election movement did 
not take hold until after the Jacksonians lost influence, led by reformers 
who argued that elected judges who derived their authority from the 
people would be more independent-minded than hand-picked friends of 
governors, or jurists subject to the beck and call of legislatures. 
Id. 
 25. SHUGERMAN, supra note 19, at 5 (arguing that states adopted judicial elections to 
increase judicial independence). Professor Shugerman’s research shows that these expecta-
tions were realized: elected judges engaged in more judicial review than their appointed 
brethren. Shugerman, supra note 23, at 1097. 
 26. Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Inde-
pendence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367 (2002). 
 27. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 691 (1995). 
 28. Perhaps the leading proponents of judicial elections, Chris Bonneau and Melinda 
Gann Hall have argued that competitive elections promote accountability to the electorate. 
CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 78–90 
(2009); see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE 
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (1980) (“Although elections might serve other functions . . . 
their role in enabling the public to assert control over the course of judicial policy-making is 
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elections, at least in theory, promote accountability by offering the people a 
direct check over one of the three branches of government and the ability to 
reconstitute the membership of the courts if they are unsatisfied with how 
judges are doing their jobs.29 Opponents respond that judicial elections ulti-
mately undermine judicial accountability because voters are unable to accu-
rately evaluate judicial candidates, often voting for candidates based on ir-
relevant traits like their name, perceived ethnicity, and position on the ballot 
rather than their judicial acumen.30 
In this section, I explore the purposes of judicial elections as well as 
how judicial elections serve those purposes. Understanding those purposes 
can help us decide whether all or only some – and if some, which – judges 
should be elected or appointed. 
A. Judicial Elections as an Accountability Mechanism 
In a constitutional democracy, elections are the primary method of 
holding elected officials accountable. In a democratic theory, accountability 
is the reason for elections,31 and judicial elections are no different. Judicial 
elections, just like elections for other local, state, and federal offices, pro-
vide a way for the people to impose popular control over the elected institu-
tion. By giving ordinary citizens an opportunity to disagree with their judg-
es, and to remove them from office because of that disagreement, the com-
munity sends a message that the judiciary serves the people of that commu-
nity as much as any other elected officials. And when people become unsat-
isfied with the performance of their judges, the next election is usually right 
around the corner.32 
Not only are elections a theoretical tool for judicial accountability, but 
history tells us that judicial elections were at least in part designed to make 
judges more accountable to the people and to ensure that judicial decisions 
were more in line with public will. During the early and mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, judges were perceived as too conservative and too friendly towards 
 
the mainstay of the argument which supports the selection of state judges by election and not 
by some other method.”); Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Su-
preme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND 
LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 165, 177 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). 
 29. DUBOIS, supra note 28. 
 30. See David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 267 
(2008) (“Those who did vote, surveys indicated, often made their selections based on factors 
such as the candidates’ ethnicity, gender, or name familiarity.”). 
 31. DUBOIS, supra note 28, at 243. 
 32. Many states that elect their judges also give those judges shorter terms than states 
that appoint their judges. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial 
Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1352 (2010). 
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corporate interests.33 Elected judges, the theory went, would be more re-
sponsive to public opinion, issuing more debtor-friendly decisions consistent 
with the wishes of the electorate.34 Elections, therefore, create an important 
link between the people and their judges. 
Mississippi was the first state to elect its judges, and an important rea-
son for its transition to judicial elections was dissatisfaction by the people of 
that state with the sitting judges.35 And even though Jacksonian democracy 
does not entirely explain the shift to elected state judiciaries, the desire to 
make judges more representative of the people is certainly part of the expla-
nation.36 At least in theory, elected judges would be expected to be more 
majoritarian, and if they weren’t, new judges would be chosen in their 
place.37 This thinking swept the nation, as state after state entered the union 
with elected rather than appointed judges. Rejecting the federal model of 
judicial selection, most states that initially adopted an appointive model also 
made the switch to judicial elections with the hope of creating a more repre-
sentative and accountable judiciary.38 
The reformers’ vision continues to this day. As judicial elections have 
become more competitive in recent years, the people have great opportunity 
to express their approval or approbation of their state judges. A number of 
judges have lost their jobs because the electorate disagreed with their deci-
sions.39 While many have criticized this aspect of judicial elections, express-
ing concern that judges who constantly look over their shoulder cannot de-
cide cases according to the mandates of the law,40 there is no denying that 
elections are the “most potent form of public discipline of all the selection 
method.”41 When the public becomes dissatisfied with judicial decisions, 
those decisions “can become rallying cries for an activist and mobilized 
 
 33. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 19. 
 34. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the 
Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 341 (1983). 
 35. SHUGERMAN, supra note 19, at 66. 
 36. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Represen-
tation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 100 (1997) (“[M]ost states moved from an 
appointive to an elective system for judges in the mid-nineteenth century because they want-
ed state court judges to be more representative of the communities they served.”). 
 37. After all, the purpose of elections is to hold the elected officials more accountable 
for their decisions. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian 
Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 724 (2010) (discussing the majoritarian tendencies of elected 
judges and arguing that “the very purpose of elections [is] to hold judges accountable to the 
voters for their decisions.”). 
 38. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 140 (1950). 
 39. The most high-profile examples are Justice Penny White in Tennessee, and Justices 
Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, and Joseph Grodin in California. 
 40. Croley, supra note 27. 
 41. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2047, 2070 (2010). 
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citizenry, who seek to resist the constitutional interpretations advanced by 
judges.”42 
Judicial elections encourage accountability by connecting the people to 
their judges and fostering discussion of legal issues that the citizens rely on 
in casting their ballots.43 In the course of an election campaign, judicial can-
didates have the opportunity to discuss the work of the court, as well as past 
and future judicial decisions.44 In a sense, they transform the judiciary into a 
more political branch of government,45 giving elected judges a more demo-
cratic pedigree and, arguably, more democratic legitimacy.46 
Not only are elections a method by which the people can hold judges 
accountable (at least in theory), but judicial elections create a more repre-
sentative judiciary. We expect elected judges to consider the views of the 
electorate in making their decisions and, in a sense, represent those views on 
the bench. For better or worse, studies have now shown that elected judges 
do take majority opinions into account when deciding cases.47 This measure 
of accountability has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts. For exam-
ple, the method of selection appears to make a difference to the outcome of 
civil48 and criminal cases.49 In criminal cases in particular, elected judges 
seem to act differently. They impose harsher criminal sentences and are 
more likely to uphold death penalty rulings, especially as an election ap-
proaches.50 Judges themselves have confirmed that trying to ignore voter 
 
 42. Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitu-
tional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 887 (1999). 
 43. John L. Warren III, Holding the Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Representatives, 6 
WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 299 (2014). 
 44. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 809–10 (2002). 
 45. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. ECON. & 
ORG. 290, 327 (2010) (concluding that elected judges are “more politically involved, more 
locally connected, and . . . more like politicians and less like professionals.”). 
 46. Pozen, supra note 41. 
 47. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges-Except All the Others 
That Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 271 (2005) (“It would appear indisputable, 
though distasteful to many observers, that elected judges do take public opinion into ac-
count.”). 
 48. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort 
Awards, 42 J.L. & Econ. 157, 162–70 (1999) (concluding that tort awards are higher in states 
with elected judiciaries). 
 49. DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE 
SUPREME COURT POLICY (1995) (showing that elected judges are less likely to favor criminal 
defendants than appointed judges). 
 50. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in 
the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 485–503 (1995) (judges become more conservative 
in criminal cases as reelection approaches); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Ac-
countability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 
(2004) (judges change their behavior as reelection approaches). 
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preferences is akin to trying to ignore a crocodile in one’s bathtub.51 That’s 
not surprising because judges, like the rest of us, want to keep their jobs. 
Admittedly, every retention method allows for judicial accountability. 
For example, in states where the governor or the legislature has the power to 
reappoint judges, the judges are held accountable to those offices, and indi-
rectly, back to the people. But judicial elections allow the people to speak 
more directly, without relying on their agents and facing all the associated 
agency problems. That is why elections are so popular among the people, 
with nearly eighty percent of the public supporting judicial elections despite 
some misgivings about the impartiality of elected judges.52 
Many critics of judicial elections acknowledge their ability to hold 
judges accountable but denounce such accountability as inconsistent with 
the judicial role.53 Some have gone so far as to argue that judicial elections 
are unconstitutional precisely because they create such a majoritarian im-
pulse in judges that they are unable to decide cases fairly.54 The link be-
tween judicial decision-making and public preferences may sound problem-
atic to us today because we have grown so accustomed to the counter-
majoritarian role that we expect our judges to play.55 In some ways, the his-
torical understanding of the judicial function is consistent with a more repre-
sentative, majoritarian judiciary. At the time of the founding, there was little 
separation between legislatures and judges.56 In addition, Federalist No. 78 
articulates the primary role of the Supreme Court as a check, on behalf of 
the people, on the other branches of government.57 
 
 51. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of 
State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 
1133 (1997). 
 52. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 43, 53 
(2003). 
 53. Pozen, supra note 11, at 265. 
 54. Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State 
Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitu-
tionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 
498 (1986) (“[I]n [at least some cases], the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear 
violation of procedural due process.”). 
 55. Croley, supra note 27, at 694. In its recommendations, the Arkansas Bar Association 
Task Force itself concluded that the role of the judiciary is to protect the minority. 
 56. SHUGERMAN, supra note 19. 
 57. Of course, in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton offers another defense of the independent 
judiciary. Not only do judges act on behalf of the people as a check on abuse by the govern-
ment, but they also act on behalf of minorities as a check on abuse by majorities. Sylvia 
Snowiss’s (and Larry Kramer’s) depiction of judicial review is consistent with the majoritari-
an, representative role that judicial elections create. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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Some critics reject the notion that judicial elections truly hold judges 
accountable. Those critics argued that the people are ignorant of judges and 
instead cast their ballots in judicial elections on the basis of the candidate’s 
name, ballot position, and other irrelevant factors.58 Others argue that cam-
paign ads, which play such an important role in modern judicial elections, 
are at best useless, and at worst misleading.59 Admittedly, these campaign 
ads generally focus on a single case or a single issue, with little focus on the 
quality of the judge. Supporters of judicial elections respond that while elec-
tions may not be the ideal accountability mechanisms, no system of ac-
countability is perfect and we should not be overly critical of judicial elec-
tions without considering other systems.60 Judicial performance is notorious-
ly tricky to evaluate, and it is not clear that governors (or merit panels) are 
better able to evaluate the quality of judicial performance. 
B. Judicial Elections as an Independence Mechanism 
For many people, accountability is the primary, perhaps the sole, bene-
fit of judicial elections. The judicial selection debate is often characterized 
as a war between election-based, accountability-enhancing regimes and ap-
pointment-based, independence-enhancing regimes.61 For critics of judicial 
elections, the biggest concern is that judicial elections undermine judicial 
independence and judicial impartiality. Elections force judges to engage in 
majoritarian judging, deciding cases according to majority opinions at the 
expense of following the law or protecting minority rights. 
While there is little question that elected judges do engage in more ma-
joritarian judging,62 this alone is insufficient to show that elections under-
mine judicial independence. After all, judges who are subject to reappoint-
ment also engage in strategic judging hoping to satisfy the reappointing 
agent or agency, usually the governor or the state legislature.63 Because al-
 
 58. Pozen, supra note 41, at 2074. 
 59. Terry Carter, Mud and Money: Judicial Elections Turn to Big Bucks and Nasty Tac-
tics, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 2005); Adam R. Long, Keeping Mud Off the Bench: The First Amend-
ment and Regulation of Candidates’ False and Misleading Statements in Judicial Elections, 
51 DUKE L.J. 787, 788–89 (2001). 
 60. Dimino, supra note 47, at 272; Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and 
the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Elections, 40 SW. L.J. 31, 32 (1985) 
(“[N]o method of judicial selection can be evaluated ‘in the abstract’ without regard to the 
performance of other methods of selection.”). 
 61. Matthew J. Streb et. al., Contestation, Competition, and the Potential for Accounta-
bility in Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 91 JUDICATURE 70 (2007) (“At the heart of 
the battle surrounding judicial elections are arguments over judicial accountability and judi-
cial independence.”). 
 62. See Dimino, supra note 47. 
 63. Dimino, supra note 47, at 272. 
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most no state has adopted the federal model of life tenure for its judges, 
complete and total judicial independence is an unrealistic (and perhaps un-
desirable) ideal. 
When we explore the history of judicial elections, we discover that one 
of the most important arguments that proponents of judicial elections made 
in favor of elections was that judicial elections were supposed to increase 
judicial independence.64 The independence that those framers cared about 
was independence from the other branches of government, and in many 
states, the legislature in particular.65 In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
when judicial elections became the dominant mode of judicial selection, the 
people were concerned about cronyism and corruption within the other 
branches of government, and worried that the judiciary—being insufficient-
ly independent of those branches—would be unable to act as a strong check 
against such corruption.66 In other words, while judicial elections create a 
stronger link between the people and the judges, they also create a greater 
separation between the judicial branch and the other two branches of gov-
ernment. And it is precisely that kind of independence—independence from 
the state legislative and executive branches—that the framers of many state 
constitutions cared about when they adopted judicial elections. 
One may question the sincerity of the argument that judicial elections 
make for a more, not less, independent judiciary, but history bore out the 
reformers’ expectation. Shortly after the states adopted judicial elections, 
judges engaged in significantly more judicial review.67 No longer dependent 
on their legislature or the governor for their job, judges were able to stand 
up to their fellow elected officials. In fact, it was only after the adoption of 
elections that state judges began striking down statutes passed by the state 
legislatures.68 
This rise in judicial review is not surprising. After all, if a judge who 
must be reelected is conscious of how the people will react to his decisions, 
a judge who must be reappointed by the governor is also likely to be con-
scious of how the governor will react to his decisions. Neither judge is com-
pletely independent of all external forces. The independence debate is large-
ly about which constituency the judge must be independent from in his or 
her decision-making. But we would expect an elected judge to be a better 
check on legislative or executive malfeasance than a judge appointed by the 
 
 64. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 19. 
 65. Unlike the Founders of the federal Constitution, which cared about independence 
from both the other branches of government and from the people themselves. See FEDERALIST 
NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Shugerman, supra note 23, at 1115–16 (discussing the rise in judicial review in 
states that had adopted judicial elections). 
 68. Id. 
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legislature for at least two reasons. First, having campaigned to the people, 
the elected judge has a better understanding of the will of the people when it 
comes to contested legal issues. And second, the elected judge may feel a 
greater sense of power and legitimacy to defy the legislature. While defer-
ence to the legislature may be essential for a judge dependent on the legisla-
ture in the next reappointment cycle, the judge may no longer feel com-
pelled to defer to the other elected branches, having been elected to office in 
the same manner. 
In short, the method by which we choose our judges has tremendous 
influence on the concepts of judicial independence and judicial accountabil-
ity. Thus, elected judges are no less independent than appointed judges, but 
the judges are independent from different appointing agents. Both sets of 
judges are accountable, but once again they are accountable to different 
people and in different ways. But is one kind of independence or one kind of 
accountability particularly appropriate for different levels of the judiciary? 
That is the question to which we now turn. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR TAILORED JUDICIAL SELECTION 
Part I suggests that different selection methods yield different levels of 
judicial independence and accountability. For most of our history when peo-
ple have sought to strike the appropriate balance between those two values, 
they have done so for the entire judicial branch in that jurisdiction. At the 
federal level, the people have opted for greater independence from the peo-
ple and the elected officials and less accountability.69 In most states, the 
people have opted for greater independence from elected officials but great-
er accountability to the people. 
If we believe there is an appropriate balance for all judges within a 
state—that all judges should be equally responsive to the people, or that 
accountability is equally necessary and possible for all levels of the judiciary 
within a state—then this unilocular approach makes sense. But in this Part, I 
 
 69. See U.S. CONST. art. III. This is not to say that federal judges have no accountability 
constraints. Even life-tenured federal judges may care about their reputation, promotion op-
portunities, and other important factors. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial 
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 675 (2009). 
Systems with permanent tenure would not completely sacrifice account-
ability for independence. Indeed, an extensive literature on federal judg-
es argues that these judges are accountable to the degree that they are 
concerned with improving their reputation, being cited by their peers, be-
ing promoted, minimizing future reversals, and reducing the possibility 
of political retribution. 
Id. See generally POSNER, supra note 9. 
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will argue that justices on courts of last resort are very different than judges 
on trial courts of general jurisdiction and that tailoring judicial selection 
methods to the level of court should at least be considered. In Section A, I 
will explain why we should consider tailoring selection methodology. In 
Section B, I will then propose a framework for how we should decide which 
judges should be elected and which should be appointed. 
A. Why Tailoring Makes Sense 
Let us assume that judicial election can create a judiciary that is more 
accountable to the people70 and is representative of the people,71 and that 
judicial appointments create a judiciary that is more accountable to the gov-
ernor (if the governor also reappoints judges) or to no one (if the judge is 
appointed for life). With these variants in mind, the question I turn to next is 
whether judicial elections are appropriate for all levels of the judiciary. Of 
course, accountability is an important value for all government officials, but 
is accountability to the electorate, and responsiveness to the people, particu-
larly well-suited to all state judges or only a subset of those judges? 
States have generally given little thought to this question. Instead, some 
states have decided that judicial elections are inappropriate for any of their 
judges and allow either the governor or the legislature to appoint, and to 
reappoint, the state’s judges.72 A majority of other states accept the benefits 
of judicial elections for all of their judges.73 Among these states, some use 
judicial elections as the method of initial selection and the method of reten-
tion.74 Others use an appointment process (sometimes with the aid of merit 
selection commissions) to initially select their judges but then require those 
judges to run in a retention election to keep their job.75 
Despite these differences, there is one constant among these states: 
they have all adopted an identical selection method for all the judges within 
 
 70. As I mentioned earlier, studies seem to confirm that elected judges decide cases 
according to the preferences of the majority. See supra note 47. 
 71. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (discussing the representative nature of 
elected judges); John L. Warren III, Holding the Bench Accountable: Judges Qua Represent-
atives, 6 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 299 (2014) (arguing that elected judges are repre-
sentative of the people that elect them). 
 72. Only Rhode Island follows the federal model of lifetime appointments for its state 
judges. Massachusetts also has no retention system, instead setting a retirement age for its 
judges. 
 73. Thirty-eight states currently use judicial elections to elect or retain at least some of 
their state judges. L. Jay Jackson, The Siege on State Courts Legislators and Special Interests 
Are Making Sure We Get the Judges They Want, A.B.A. J., at 54, 57 (July 2013). 
 74. Even as to this subset, there are important differences. For example, some states use 
partisan judicial elections, while other states have adopted nonpartisan judicial elections. 
 75. See supra note 3. 
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their judicial system. Under this homogenous approach, either all the judges 
are appointed or all the judges are elected.76 The same is true of our Article 
III courts. When the framers were creating the judicial branch in the United 
States Constitution, little consideration was given to methods of judicial 
selection. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton devotes a few scant words to selec-
tion methodology, merely asserting that judges will be selected the same 
way as all other federal officers.77 The idea of tailoring selection methods to 
different levels of the judiciary was not even considered.78 
Some states have tried to have the best of both worlds, seemingly tai-
loring the selection method to the court in question. The idea behind such a 
tailored system is the belief that judicial elections are appropriate for some 
judges but not others, and the idea itself is not new. In fact, the concept of 
tailoring the selection methodology to the level of the court has been around 
for a long time. When states began to experiment with judicial elections in 
the early nineteenth century, they largely adopted a similar approach. In 
1812, Georgia became the first state to adopt judicial elections, but only 
“inferior” court judges were elected.79 Four years later, Indiana adopted ju-
dicial elections; again, only for its circuit courts.80 Even after Mississippi 
became the first state to elect all its judges in 1832, many states in the fol-
lowing decades adopted judicial elections for only some of their lower court 
judges, including Georgia, Michigan, Iowa, and Arkansas.81 
However, these decisions were made with little reason or considera-
tion. The historical records contain no discussion about why some judges 
(usually appellate judges) continued to be appointed while others (usually 
trial judges) would be elected. Even now, ten states continue to use minor 
variations on this theme, including three of the most populous states in the 
nation: New York, Florida, and California.82 In all ten states that differenti-
ate judicial selection and retention by level of the judiciary, just as in all the 
states that experimented with such schemes in the past, vacancies on trial 
courts of general jurisdiction are filled through partisan or nonpartisan elec-
tions, while vacancies on the state’s highest appellate courts are filled 
 
 76. Of course, this is a generalization. Even in the federal system, all Article III judges 
are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, but there are a number of other 
federal judges, including Bankruptcy Judges and Magistrate Judges, who are selected differ-
ently. 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 78. Id.; In fact, the federal constitution only created one court––the United States Su-
preme Court––and left the creation of future courts to Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 79. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 19, at 276. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. The other states using a hybrid selection method are Arizona (some counties), Indi-
ana (partisan elections for trial courts, judicial nominating commissions for intermediate and 
highest courts), Kansas (some counties), Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. 
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through gubernatorial appointment or a judicial nomination commission.83 
Recently, Arkansas had been considering a move in the same direction, 
leaving the long-standing election process in place for trial judges while 
abandoning it for the justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court.84 
The theory of tailored selection makes a great deal of sense. It accepts 
the reality that we are mistaken to view the judiciary as a monolith. Of 
course, if we are going to tailor judicial selection methodology to particular 
judges or courts, we must decide the criteria by which we make these deci-
sions. One possible way to differentiate judges is based on the kinds of cases 
they decide. For example, when judges engage in statutory interpretation, 
some argue that the judge’s role is to act as a “faithful agent” of the legisla-
ture.85 Of course, this is not the only theory of what the court is doing when 
interpreting a statute, but if we adopt that approach, then perhaps it makes 
sense to allow the lawmaker (here, the legislature) to select the judges that 
will interpret its laws. In interpreting the constitution on the other hand, the 
judge interprets the law made by the people to check abuses by the legisla-
ture and the executive.86 If that’s true, then perhaps it makes most sense to 
give people a greater voice in selecting its constitutional judges. Common 
law is a different creature altogether. 
Unfortunately, such a distinction only makes sense if we had highly 
specialized courts. For example, many nations throughout Europe, including 
Germany and France, have created constitutional courts.87 Those courts are 
the ultimate authority on those nations’ constitutions. Some states have 
likewise created a panoply of specialized courts, including family courts, 
business courts, and drug courts.88 And sometimes, states have adopted dif-
ferent selection methods for those courts. In Maine for example, the gover-
nor appoints most state judges while probate judges are elected.89 However, 
most judges are generalists, and every judge handles a wide range of cases. 
 
 83. See supra note 3. 
 84. See TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY 6 
(2016). The proposal was ultimately rejected. 
 85. John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001) (supporting the position that courts should act as the “faith-
ful agents” of the legislature). 
 86. See generally KRAMER, supra note 57. 
 87. Justice Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional 
Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045 (2000) (discussing the European model of constitutional 
courts). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lay, J., con-
curring) (discussing the development of specialized courts in the states). 
 89. Peter L. Murray, Maine’s Overdue Judicial Reforms, 62 ME. L. REV. 631, 632–33 
(2010) (“[T]he Maine county probate courts with part-time elected judges comprise an em-
barrassing anomaly in a system otherwise free of judicial elections and part-time judges.”). 
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In one day the judge may decide whether a federal or state statute is consti-
tutional, sentence a criminal defendant, hear a custody proceeding, and pre-
side over a common-law tort case. Thus, any distinction based on the typol-
ogy of cases is impossible. 
There is another natural split within our judiciary, and that is between 
the levels of the court. All states divide their judges into trial judges and 
appellate judges. Most scholars and judges recognize that there are signifi-
cant differences between these two groups. In the words of the late Justice 
Scalia, “trial judges are fundamentally different from appellate judges.”90 
B. Creating a Framework for Tailoring 
Do the differences between trial judges and supreme court justices mer-
it a different selection method? As mentioned earlier, some states have 
thought so, choosing to elect trial judges and appoint appellate judges, usu-
ally the justices of the highest state court. But as far as I am aware, none of 
the states that adopted these schemes closely examined which judges should 
be elected, nor is there any history showing precisely why they chose the 
regime they did. Perhaps it was intuitive that the highest-level judges in the 
state should be most independent or most removed from the people. Maybe 
the states determined that elections make the most sense for lower court 
judges because these were mostly local courts and the public was more 
knowledgeable about them than about state supreme court justices.91 Re-
gardless, without exception, every state that at first glance has adopted a 
tailored approach to judicial selection has chosen to appoint the higher-court 
judges and elect lower-court judges. 
I believe this is a mistake.92 In deciding how to structure the hybrid sys-
tem, we must consider the purposes of judicial elections93 and use the sys-
tem that furthers those purposes. What are the key criteria that states should 
consider in making that decision? I believe there are three factors that we 
must consider. 
First, elections should be used for those courts where accountability to 
the electorate is most important. Most people would agree that in a democ-
 
 90. ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ACT OF 
PERSUADING JUDGES 7 (Thomson West 2008). 
 91. It is not entirely clear that any state consciously considered this factor. Regardless, 
the rise of modern judicial elections and the growth of the media makes this factor obsolete. 
 92. I am not the first person to suggest this. For example, at a dinner, Justice Phillips 
apparently suggested this as “the best judicial selection system.” Symposium, Improving the 
Election of Judges, Part II Featuring: Michael Sweeney, William Weisenberg, Seth S. Ander-
sen with Seth D. Kirschenbaum, As Moderator, 56 MERCER L. REV. 859, 864 (2005). Regard-
less, I have found no scholarship examining this idea in any kind of depth. 
 93. As discussed above, the purposes relate to judicial accountability and relative judi-
cial independence. 
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racy, the officials who make the law should be accountable to the electorate. 
That means to the extent we can differentiate judges who engage in law-
making and policy-making functions from those judges who engage in law-
implementing functions, the former should be elected. The corollary is that 
appointments are more appropriate for judges who implement the legal and 
policy judgments made by others, including those made by other courts, and 
who engage in more individualized case-by-case adjudication where public 
opinion should play a lesser role.94 
Second, elections should be used for courts where accountability to the 
people is most lacking. In other words, accountability is most important for 
courts where fewer accountability mechanisms are already in place. To the 
contrary, elections are less important, and therefore appointments are more 
appropriate, for judges who are already held accountable for their decisions, 
both by the people and by other judges.95 
Third, judicial elections make the most sense for positions where the 
people are in the best position to adequately select judges based on the rele-
vant criteria for the job. After all, accountability to the public makes little 
sense when the electorate is unable to hold the elected official accountable, 
either because of ignorance of the judge’s role, an inability to assess the 
judge’s performance of that role, or the technical nature of the judge’s role. 
For the judges who engage in more technical and managerial functions that 
are best evaluated by other members of the legal profession rather than the 
public as a whole, appointments, or some other system of election and reten-
tion, are most appropriate. 
IV. WHY ELECTIONS ARE BEST SUITED FOR COURTS OF LAST RESORT,  
AND LEAST SUITED FOR TRIAL JUDGES 
Now that we’ve established the parameters for choosing between elec-
tions and appointments, we can apply this framework to two different levels 
of the judiciary—the state’s trial courts and the state highest court.96 
 
 94. Of course, the difficulty with this standard is that all judges make and implement law 
and policy, but as I explain in Part III, below, trial judges engage in more law-
implementation while the courts of last resort engage in more law-making. 
 95. Again, all judges are held accountable to someone, so we are talking about relative 
levels of accountability. 
 96. For the purposes of this article, I set aside the question of how to treat the intermedi-
ate state courts. In some ways, intermediate courts resemble the state’s highest court. In other 
ways, they resemble trial courts. 
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A. Where Is Accountability/Representativeness to the People Most Needed? 
For decades, legal scholars have disputed the core function of judges in 
a justice system, contrasting the policy-making and dispute resolution func-
tions of the courts.97 Some contend that the role of the court is to resolve 
concrete, personal, discrete disputes.98 Others suggest that dispute resolution 
is merely a byproduct of the primary judicial function of making policy and 
defining values.99 Under this view, the primary role of the courts is to ad-
vance broader, public-regarding aims.100 Of course, judges do both of these 
things. They adjudicate individual cases, and through that adjudication they 
make law and policy. Few people today will deny that judges can make law, 
even in the fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation.101 
While we cannot clearly delineate which judges make law and policy 
and which judges merely apply those laws and policies to individual cases, 
there seems to be general agreement that appellate courts engage in more of 
the former and trial courts in more of the latter.102 Trial judges engage in 
more individualized decision-making rather than wholesale, general law-
making.103 For example, trial judges engage in significantly more fact-
finding and case management than deciding pure issues of law.104 In fact, the 
academic literature identifies law-making as one of the primary functions of 
appellate courts, along with its error-correction function. Appellate judges 
 
 97. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN, REFLECTIONS ON THE ENIGMA OF INDETERMINACY 
IN CHILD-ADVOCACY CASES IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (W.H. Freeman and Co. 1985). 
 98. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 457, 470 (“The primary purpose for which courts were created . . . is to decide 
cases according to the substantive law.”). 
 99. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 597–
602 (1983). 
 100. Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979) (“[C]ourts exist 
to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.”). 
 101. Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire 
Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. 113 (2010) (In his confirmation hearing, Justice Roberts analogized 
the role of a judge to the role of a baseball umpire. Roberts explained to the Senate that 
“[u]mpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.” That analogy has been heavily criticized 
by scholars and commentators.). 
 102. Richard Lempert, The Dynamics of Informal Procedure: The Case of a Public Hous-
ing Eviction Board, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 368 n.36 (1989) (“[T]he courts that do the 
law making are ordinarily appellate courts rather than trial courts.”). 
 103. SHUGERMAN, supra note 19, at 60. 
 104. See HERBERT JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 31 (1965) (distinguishing between the 
law- and policy-making function of appellate courts and the law-enforcement function of trial 
courts); John J. Brunetti, Searching for Methods of Trial Court Fact-Finding and Decision-
Making, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1491–92 (1998) (“The process by which a trial judge adju-
dicates non-jury fact issues should not be confused with the various processes by which ap-
pellate courts “make law.”). 
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decide cases and resolve legal issues that will guide lower courts in their 
future decisions. Appellate judges thus tend to decide cases “as to ensure 
that the law created by the lower courts is uniform, and in so doing, often 
articulate what is, in effect, a novel rule of law.”105 Because their opinions 
tend to apply more across the board to the citizens of the state, the appellate 
opinion has a larger, more important law-making function. As one commen-
tator put it, “[d]istrict courts do not write primarily for precedent.”106 
In the words of Frank Cross, “[t]rial judges tend to confront more ‘easy 
cases,’ with less ideological contestation, than appellate judges do, and trial 
judges’ decisions have less precedential impact. As a result, their opinions 
are somewhat less ideological than those of appellate courts.”107 There is no 
denying that trial courts often make law as well, and tend to perceive them-
selves as lawmakers.108 Rarely will a judge decide a hard case without en-
gaging in at least some lawmaking. For example, a trial judge’s sentencing 
decision is laden with policy values, but few people would dispute that their 
exercise of lawmaking power is less frequent and a less prevalent part of 
their work.109 
Painting with a broad brush, the work of a trial judge tends to be more 
technical. Fact-finding is an important part of their job, and trial judges’ 
factual findings are generally accepted by appellate courts.110 Trial judges 
also tend to be more specialized. Often, trial judges were successful trial 
lawyers before joining the bench. Supreme court justices often have similar 
 
 105. See William Bunting, Note, Election-by-Lot as A Judicial Selection Mechanism, 2 
NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 166, 197 (2006) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CRISIS AND REFORM 12 (1985)). 
 106. Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have 
Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 950 (1995). 
 107. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1457, 1481 n.162 (2003) (citing Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in 
American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 236 tbl.3 (1999)); Ware, supra note 
15, at 181 (“[T]he extent to which (inevitable) judicial lawmaking allows judges to inject 
their political views into law rises, the higher the court. Trial judges play less of a lawmaking 
role than appellate judges, especially supreme court justices, simply because court systems 
are hierarchical and trial courts are at the bottom.”). 
 108. Cf. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Breen, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Law-
yers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 139 (2009) (arguing that if professional rules of conduct are tanta-
mount to law, then trial courts must respect them to provide a standardized system of regula-
tion for lawyers). 
 109. See id. at 117 (arguing that trial judges’ “authority to make law is limited, both in 
when the power to set legal standards arises and in the considerations trial courts may take 
into account.”). 
 110. James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REV. 
795, 804–05 (1995) 
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training, but because of the more lawmaking nature of their job, it is not 
unusual to see politicians, academics, and others appointed as justices.111 
Trial judges are forced to deal with factually complex topics and is-
sues112 without much help. Expertise therefore, becomes a critical trait in a 
good trial judge, including scientific and technological expertise. Trial judg-
es make the technical decisions that appellate judges not only rely on, but 
defer to, utilizing standards of review like clear error and abuse of discre-
tion. For someone who is more likely to face technocratic decisions that 
require high levels of technical skill, “accountability to the people” that un-
derlies judicial elections is perhaps less important than for judges who en-
gage in lawmaking. 
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White,113 seemed to acknowledge the policy-making role of state supreme 
court justices and distinguished it from the law-implementing role of lower-
level judges. Stevens wrote that: 
[e]ven if announcing one’s views in the context of a campaign for the 
State Supreme Court might be permissible, the same statements are sure-
ly less appropriate when one is running for an intermediate or trial court 
judgeship. Such statements . . . mislead the voters by giving them the 
false impression that a candidate for the trial court will be able to and 
should decide cases based on his personal views rather than precedent.
114
 
In other words, Justice Stevens seems to agree that appellate judges 
have a much greater opportunity to impose their own views on the public 
because they have a greater capacity to ignore precedent and are more likely 
to decide issues of policy than trial judges. 
Justices on state courts of last resort decide cases with fewer “legal” 
constraints than state trial judges. In the state high courts, like in the United 
States Supreme Court, “decisional guidance provided by the orthodox legal 
materials is weakest.”115 This allows political, ideological, and policy con-
siderations to play a much greater role in judicial decision-making in those 
courts. Of course, most cases decided by state supreme courts are not as 
politically charged as those decided by the United States Supreme Court.116 
But nonetheless, state courts of last resort are more likely to decide cases 
 
 111. Nationally, prominent examples include Earl Warren, Sandra Day O’Connor, and 
Elena Kagan. 
 112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING (2013). 
 113. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 n.2 (2002). 
 114. Id. 
 115. POSNER, supra note 9, at 14. 
 116. There are many explanations for this, including the nearly complete control that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has over its own docket. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 
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where traditional legal methods fail to provide an answer; thus, it is more 
likely that these courts will resort to ideological or political decision-
making.117 
B. Where Is Accountability to the People Most Lacking? 
Next, let us examine which level of the judiciary is most in need of ac-
countability. Here, I believe elections are more necessary for appellate judg-
es than for trial judges. 
Trial judges are already held significantly more accountable for their 
decisions.118 For trial judges on state courts of general jurisdiction, there is 
always at least one, and usually two levels of appellate courts that can over-
turn their decisions.119 Although review of factual determinations by trial 
judges is generally fairly deferential, there is always another set of eyes that 
looks at the trial judge’s determinations. 
In addition, not only are the decisions of trial courts reviewed by appel-
late courts, but trial judges must follow guidance set out by earlier cases. 
Appellate courts generally adopt the tests for trial judges to use. Supreme 
court justices, on the other hand, are free to overturn precedent once they 
disagree with it. State supreme court justices have no superior authority on 
issues of state law, and only the United States Supreme Court oversees them 
on issues of federal law.120 And while the United States Supreme Court has 
theoretical power to review cases or controversies that raise federal ques-
tions (or arise in diversity jurisdiction), it exercises that power so infrequent-
ly that the state’s highest court is almost always that court of last resort in 
any state court litigation. State supreme court justices operate with little 
oversight. 
There are many other checks on the work of trial judges. For example, 
trial judges generally use pattern jury instructions to advise the jury of the 
law rather than being able to craft their own legal standards and principles. 
In addition, more of their work happens in the public eye. Trials can be tele-
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vised, and many of the proceedings happen in open court. At key phases of 
litigation, lawyers, litigants, and others are present. Contrast that with the 
work of appellate judges, who deliberate in private and whose interaction 
with the public is often limited.121 In fact, the mere presence of the public 
and of the jury is intended to be a critical check on judicial bias. There is no 
similar institution at the appellate level. Lay people are rarely present to see 
the work of a supreme court justice. 
C. Where the People Are Most Capable of Holding Judges Accountable 
Election law scholars have emphasized that voters rely heavily on heu-
ristics like party labels and endorsements to cast their votes.122 This is par-
ticularly true of judicial elections where voters are largely ignorant about the 
candidates.123 After all, no matter what level of the judiciary we are speaking 
about, much of the work of a judge happens behind closed doors. Other than 
coverage of a handful of key U.S. Supreme Court decisions, there is little 
media interest in the work of the judicial branch. State courts in particular 
receive little attention, and few people can identify any state judges.124 
While heuristics like party labels may have some important meaning 
for our understanding of supreme court justices, they have much less mean-
ing for the work of a trial judge. The reason for that is a trial judge’s role has 
become more managerial in nature.125 Much of what trial judges do is man-
age pre-trial motion practice, discovery, and the settlement discussions be-
tween the parties. This is particularly true with the expansion of the rules of 
civil procedure, as well as the rules of evidence.126 Cases like Daubert and 
the more recent amendments to Rule 702 have forced “trial judges to be-
come increasingly comfortable with the notion that they can and should 
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delve much deeper into the scientific and fact-finding process.”127 The func-
tion of the trial court has shifted “from enforcing the rule of law to pretrial 
docket management.”128 
In addition to the expansion of the rules of evidence and civil proce-
dure is the exponential growth of electronic data. In many cases, the discov-
ery process is incredibly intensive because of the volume of electronic data 
in possession of the parties. This “has caused a shift from a relatively unso-
phisticated but labor-intensive process, to one requiring specialized tech-
nical knowledge.”129 “Computerization has made the protection of confiden-
tial data increasingly difficult, heightening the need for an impartial discov-
ery manager to safeguard the due process rights of litigants, and to limit the 
imposition of undue economic burden.”130 Often, the trial judge is asked to 
serve that role. 
Can a lay voter evaluate a trial judge’s performance in performing 
these managerial and highly technical functions? I believe the answer is no. 
The people are in a much worse position to hold trial judges accountable for 
their handling of litigation. What’s more, heuristics like party affiliations 
mean much less at the trial level where little law-making takes place. In-
stead, the people who are in a much better position to evaluate the work of 
these judges are lawyers, witnesses, probation officers, and other court per-
sonnel.131 
State supreme court justices, on the other hand, have much less fre-
quent interaction with lawyers, litigants, jurors, court personnel, expert wit-
nesses, and other actors within the justice system. Their decisions receive 
substantially more coverage and attention, especially decisions on contro-
versial legal issues. This gives an average voter at least some information 
about the politics of the justices and the factors that the justices consider in 
making their decisions. Judicial elections therefore, make much more sense 
for state supreme court justices. Admittedly, the public’s knowledge is still 
fairly limited even when it comes to these judges, but relatively speaking, 
the public is in the much better place to assess and evaluate their work. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Judicial elections are designed to give people an ability to hold judges 
accountable. But as this article shows, accountability to the people is more 
lacking, more necessary, and more feasible for some judges (state supreme 
court justices) than others (trial judges). Rather than treating all judges the 
same way for the purposes of selection methodology, we should consider 
the differences in the judicial role at different levels of the state judiciary 
and tailor the selection methods to those differences. This article sketches 
out the proposal for what such tailoring might look like and the factors that 
should be considered. 
